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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
not admissible in the interpretation of wills unless the subject or object of the
gift is unclear from the instrument itself.
Char..able Bequesfs and fhe Docfrine of Cy Pres
The doctrine of cy pres permits application of charitable gifts by the courts ia
a manner similar to but not directly in accordance with the specific intent of the
testator, where the specific instructions of the testator have become impossible,
impractical, or illegal to perform. 21 Although the theories and policies which have
supported the doctrine have varied with historical shifts in philosophical and
political emphasis, one underlying purpose still vital has been the preservation of
gifts for the benefit of society where that can be done without impinging upon
testamentary freedom.
22
Before the cy pres doctrine may be applied, however, the courts must find
that the testator had a general charitable intent to benefit a larger class (than
the immediate beneficiary), in which the substituted object or mode is included,
rather than a mere specific intent to benefit the stated object in the particular
manner.2 3 A testator's intent is gleaned primarily from the will itself.24 As a
practical matter, however, the courts will construe the testator's intent liberally
where it is possible to do so so as to preserve a charitable gift.25
The Court of Appeals adopted a restrictive construction, however, during
this term. Testator provided in his will for a $10,000 endowment fund for the
College of Medicine of Syracuse University. The trust fund was applied in the
manner specified for twenty-six years. The question in this case was whether the
endowment could be transferred to the state when the Medical College was sold
to the State University and operated thereafter as a state institution. The Appellate
Division, finding, in view of all the circumstances, a general intent on the part of
the testator to aid medical education generally through the facilities of the College,
allowed the transfer under cy pres. The Court of Appeals, however, inferred an
express disavowal of a general charitable intent by the testator from the fact that
the vesting of the original gift was contingdnt on the College's attaining certain
accreditation within one year without any provision in the will for a substitutional
21. Cy pres applied only to charitable trusts by the common law, but now
extends to absolute charitable gifts in New York. N. Y. Pans. PRop. LAw §12.
N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §113. See also Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N.Y.
462, 130 N.E. 613 (1921); In re Potter, 307 N.Y. 504, 121 N.E.2d 522 (1954); 2
RESTATEMENT, TRusTs §399 (1935).
22. For a discussion of the developing rationalia of the doctrine, see Fisch,
The Cy Pres Doctrine and Changing Philosophies, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 375 (1953).
23. Saltsman v. Greene, 256 N.Y. 636, 177 N.E. 172 (1931), affirming 136
Misc. 497, 243 N.Y. Supp. 576 (Sup.Ct. 1930). 4 ScoTT, TRusTs §399 (2d ed. 1956).
N. Y. PE . PROP. LAW §12(2). N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW §113(2).
24. In re Watson, 262 N.Y. 284, 186 N.E. 787 (1933).
25. In re Potter, 307 N.Y. 504, 517, 121 N.E.2d 522, 528 (1954).
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charitable disposition in the event the contingency was not met. The requisite
general intent lacking, cy pres could not be applied and the fund reverted to the
testator's heirs.
26
The decision seems contrary to the policy of liberal construction of charitable
bequests. Such gifts have been construed to permit cy pres application even where
the testator had provided a substitutional gift to private persons in event of the
lapse or failure of the gift for any reason.27 And where a charitable gift has been
made on a condition which could not be fulfilled, cy pres has been utilized to
save the gift, the condition being construed as not requiring that the gift fail
when it becomes impractical or impossible to carry out.
8
The Court decided closely analogous cases in the prior term and came to a
different result. The question there was whether bequests to hospitals in Great
Britain, which had been nationalized by the government subsequent to the testator's
death, could still pass to the hospitals. It was held that they could. Applying liberal
rules of construction, the Court held that the hospitals receiving the gifts and
those to which. they had been bequeathed were identical, notwithstanding the
intervening change in ownership. The question of cy pres application was avoided
since the gifts had never vested in possession of the hospitals before nationalization.
The issue, construction of testator's intent, was the same, however, since in each
case the testator had died several years before nationalization was contemplated.29
Here also, it cannot be rationally stated that the medical college had ceased
to exist because of the transfer of ownership and operation to the State University.
Furthermore, even though the contingent nature of the vesting of the original
bequest may indicate an absence of a general intent to benefit medicine as such,
it seems purely speculative to suggest that the testator meant that the gift, once
having vested, should continue only until ownership of the school was changed.
The result of the decision is to exalt the "dead hand" (with no certainty of what
its owner would have wished) and to discourage reorganization of public charities
and their absorption by government in a society whose expectations of govern-
mental responsibility are constantly changing.
A return to a policy of more liberal construction by the courts would be in
20. In re Syracuse University, 3 N.Y.2d 665, 171 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1958), re-
versbig In re Heffron, 2 A.D.2d 466, 156 N.Y.S.2d 779 (4th Dep't 1956).
27. Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N.Y. 462, 130 N.E. 613 (1921).
28. In re Gary, 161 Misc. 351, 292 N.Y.Supp. 785 (Surr.Ct. 1935), aff'd, 248
App.Div. 373, 288 N.Y.Supp. 382 (1st Dep't 1936), aff'd 272 N.Y. 635, 5 N.E.2d
363 (1936).
29. In re Ablett's Will, 3 N.Y.2d 261, 165 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1957). In re Perkin's
Will, 3 N.Y.2d 281, 165 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1957). In re Bishop's Will, 3 N.Y.2d 294, 165
N.Y.S.2d 86 (1957). Judge Van Voorhis, author of the opinion in the instant
case, dissented to each of those cases on reasoning substantially as in the in-
stant opinion.
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keeping with the underlying theory of cy pres. However, the instant decision
raises basic considerations which should lead to a legislative reevaluation of the
policies involved. Not merely testementary freedom is here involved; the public
reliaL -e upon the continuity of public trusts is also pertinent. Pennsylvania has
recognized this by abolishing, by statute, the requirement for a general intent,
charitable gifts in that jurisdiction passing cy pres wherever necessary unless the
testator has expressly provided otherwise by a gift over or remainder clause.30
In a time of social change, such a provjion recommends itself as a fair compromise
between private rights and the public interest and a preferable alternative to the
uncertainties inherent in the rule applying in New York.31
Will Consfruction
In In re Gautier's Will,3 2 the term "surviving" was used in a devise where
the first legatee took a life estate, the remainder to a determinable class or in the
alternative to a "surviving" class. In this situation the slight presumption is that
"surviving" means surviving the previous estate.33 Rules of construction,
however, need not be resorted to, when from a reading of the will in its entirety,
the testator's intention is dear.0 4 The Appellate Division,"5 seeking the intention
of the testator, referred to a later paragraph where the testator had declared,
"I have not made any provision" for Charles Gautier, a nephew. If "surviving"
meant surviving the life beneficiary, part of the estate could pass by intestacy,
and in that manner Charles Gautier's estate-could realize an intestate share.
On this basis the Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate Court and found that
the testator's intention was that the term "surviving" meant surviving the
testator himself. Such a decision avoids any partial intestacy and provides for an
earlier, rather than later vesting of estates.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and held that the
term "surviving" meant surviving the previous beneficiary. When the testa-
tor referred to survival of himself he used the words "survive me," indicating
that the term "surviving" refers to something different, and this supports the
slight presumption that in such a clause "survival" refers to the termination of
the previous estate. The fact that Charles Gautier has a possibility of an intestate
share, although not contemplated by the testator, is mere happenstance and not
an indication of the meaning of the word "surviving.
30. PA. ESrATES ACT OF 1947, 20 P.S. §301.10 (1947).
31. The requirement of general intent has been subjected to criticism.
See, e.g., 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, §436 (1935); Note A Revaluation of
Cy Pres, 49 Yale L.J. 303, 317-323 (1939).
32. 4 N.Y.2d 502, 169 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1957).
33. Fowler v. Ingersoll, 127 N.Y. 473 (1891); 2 JARMAN ON WILLS 759 (5th
ed. 1893); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §251 (1940).
34. In re Pubis, 220 N.Y. 196, 202. 115 N.E. 516, 518 (1917).
35. In re Gautier's Will, 3 A.D.2d 750, 160 N.Y.S.2d 238 (2d Dep't 1957)
and 3 A.D.2d 752, 161 N.Y.S.2d 574 (2d Dep't 1957).
